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Abstract: This note characterizes ordinal potential games by the absence of weak improvement cycles and an order
condition on the strategy space. This order condition is automatically satised if the strategy space is countable.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Number: C72.
1 Introduction
Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduce several classes of potential games. A common feature of
these classes is the existence of a real-valued function on the strategy space that incorporates the
strategic possibilities of all players simultaneously. In their paper, Monderer and Shapley (1996)
distinguish between exact and ordinal potential games. As an example of an exact potential
game, consider the two-person game in Figure 1a, where the rst player chooses either T or B,
and the second player simultaneously and independently chooses either L or R. The numbers
in the corresponding cells are the payos to player 1 and 2, respectively. Also, consider the real-
valued function on the strategy space given in Figure 1b. Notice that the change in the payo
to a unilaterally deviating player exactly equals the corresponding change in the value of this
function. For instance, if the second player deviates from (T; L) to (T;R), his payo increases
by one, just like the function in Figure 1b. This function is therefore called an exact potential









property that the changes in payo to deviating players along a cycle sum to zero, where a cycle
in the strategy space is a closed sequence of strategy combinations in which players unilaterally
deviate from one point to the next. The game in Figure 2a is an example of an ordinal potential
game. Consider the function in Figure 2b and notice that the sign of the change in the payo
to a unilaterally deviating player exactly matches the sign of the corresponding change in this
function. For instance, if the second player deviates from (T; L) to (T;R), his payo increases,











just like the function in Figure 2b. Since deviating from (T;R) to (B;R) does not change player
1's payo, the value of the function remains the same. For this reason, this function is called an
ordinal potential of the game.
Monderer and Shapley do not give a characterization of ordinal potential games. The class
of nite ordinal potential games was characterized in Voorneveld (1996) through the absence of
weak improvement cycles, i.e., cycles along which a unilaterally deviating player never incurs a
lower payo and at least one such player increases his payo. The necessity of this condition
is immediate, since a potential function would never decrease along a weak improvement cycle,
but increases at least once. This gives a contradiction, because a cycle ends up where it started.
Proving suciency is harder. In this note we characterize the total class of ordinal potential
games. It turns out that countable ordinal potential games are still characterized by the absence
of weak improvement cycles, but that for uncountable ordinal potential games an additional order
condition on the strategy space is required.
The organization of this note is as follows: Denitions and some preliminary results are
given in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide a full characterization of ordinal potential games.
In Section 4 we indicate that the absence of weak improvement cycles characterizes ordinal
potential games with a countable strategy space, but not necessarily ordinal potential games in
which the strategy space is uncountable.
2 Denitions and preliminary results
A strategic game is a tuple G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni, where N is the player set, for each i 2 N
the set of player i's strategies is X i, and ui :
Q
i2N X
i ! IR is player i's payo function.
For brevity, we dene X =
Q
i2N X
i and for i 2 N : X i =
Q
j2NnfigX
j. Let x 2 X and
i 2 N . With a slight abuse of notation, we sometimes denote x = (xi; x i).
Let G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni be a strategic game. A path in the strategy space X is a
sequence (x1; x2; : : :) of elements xk 2 X such that for all k = 1; 2; : : : the strategy combinations
xk and xk+1 dier in exactly one, say the i(k)-th, coordinate. A path is non-deteriorating
if ui(k)(xk)  u
i(k)(xk+1) for all k = 1; 2; : : :. A nite path (x1; : : : ; xm) is called a weak
improvement cycle if it is non-deteriorating, x1 = xm, and u
i(k)(xk) < u
i(k)(xk+1) for some
k 2 f1; : : : ; m  1g.
Dene a binary relation < on the strategy space X as follows: x < y if there exists a non-
deteriorating path from x to y. The binary relation  on X is dened by x  y if x < y and
y < x.
By checking reexivity, symmetry, and transitivity, one sees that the binary relation  is
an equivalence relation. Denote the equivalence class of x 2 X with respect to  by [x], i.e.,
[x] = fy 2 X jy  xg, and dene a binary relation  on the set X of equivalence classes as
follows: [x]  [y] if [x] 6= [y] and x < y. To show that this relation is well-dened, observe that
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the choice of representatives in the equivalence classes is of no concern:
8x; ~x; y; ~y 2 X with x  ~x and y  ~y : x < y , ~x < ~y:
Notice, moreover, that the relation  on X is irreexive and transitive. The equivalence
relation  plays an important role in the characterization of ordinal potential games.
Denition 1 [Monderer and Shapley, 1996] A strategic game G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni is
an ordinal potential game if there exists a function P : X ! IR such that
8i 2 N; 8x i 2 X i; 8xi; yi 2 X i : ui(xi; x i) > ui(yi; x i), P (xi; x i) > P (yi; x i):
The function P is called an (ordinal) potential of the game G.
In other words, if P is an ordinal potential function for G, the sign of the change in payo to a
unilaterally deviating player matches the sign of the change in the value of P .
A necessary condition for the existence of an ordinal potential function is the absence of
weak improvement cycles.
Lemma 2.1 Let G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni be a strategic game. If G is an ordinal potential
game, then X contains no weak improvement cycles.
Proof. Assume G is an ordinal potential game and suppose that (x1; : : : ; xm) is a weak im-
provement cycle. By denition, ui(k)(xk)  u
i(k)(xk+1) for all k 2 f1; : : : ; m   1g with strict
inequality for at least one such k. But then P (xk)  P (xk+1) for all and strict inequality for at
least one k 2 f1; : : : ; m  1g, implying P (x1) < P (xm) = P (x1), a contradiction. 2
In Section 4, we will show that the converse of Lemma 2.1 is true if (X;) is properly ordered.
Denition 2 Consider a tuple (A;) consisting of a set A and an irreexive and transitive
binary relation . (A;) is properly ordered if there exists a function F : A! IR that preserves
the order :
8x; y 2 A : x  y ) F (x) < F (y):
Properly ordered sets are a key topic of study in utility theory. Not every tuple (A;) with 
irreexive and transitive is properly ordered. A familiar example is the lexicographic order on
IR2. See, e.g., Fishburn (1979) for more details. However, if the set A is countable, i.e. if A is
nite or if there exists a bijection between A and IN, then (A;) is properly ordered.
Lemma 2.2 Let A be a countable set and  a binary relation on A that is irreexive and
transitive. Then (A;) is properly ordered.
Proof. Since A is countable, we can label its elements and write A = fx1; x2; : : :g. For k 2 IN
dene Ak = fx1; : : : ; xkg. We dene F : A ! IR by an inductive argument. Dene F (x1) = 0.
Let k 2 IN and assume F has already been dened on Ak such that
8x; y 2 Ak : x  y ) F (x) < F (y): (1)
We extend F to Ak+1. Dene
Lk = fx 2 Ak jx  xk+1g
Uk = fx 2 Ak jxk+1  xg:
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If Lk 6= ;, take l = maxz2Lk F (z) and x 2 argmaxz2Lk F (z). If Uk 6= ;, take u = minz2Uk F (z)
and y 2 argminz2Uk F (z). If both Lk and Uk are non-empty, then x  xk+1 and xk+1  y imply
x  y by transitivity; so given that F satises (1), l = F (x) < F (y) = u.
 If Lk = ; and Uk = ;, take F (xk+1) = 0;
 If Lk = ; and Uk 6= ;, take F (xk+1) 2 ( 1; u);
 If Lk 6= ; and Uk = ;, take F (xk+1) 2 (l;1);
 If Lk 6= ; and Uk 6= ;, take F (xk+1) 2 (l; u).
Notice that F is now correctly dened on Ak+1:
8x; y 2 Ak+1 : x  y ) F (x) < F (y):
It follows that by proceeding in this way we nd a function F on A as in the theorem. 2
In Example 4.1, we will give an example of a game in which (X;) is not properly ordered.
A sucient condition for an uncountable set (A;) to be properly ordered is the existence of
a countable subset B of A such that if x  z; x 62 B; z 62 B, there exists a y 2 B such that
x  y; y  z. Such a set B is -order dense in A.
Lemma 2.3 Let A be a set and  a binary relation on A that is irreexive and transitive. If
there exists a countable subset of A that is -order dense in A, then (A;) is properly ordered.
Proof. This is a corollary of Theorem 3.2 in Fishburn (1979). 2
3 Characterization of ordinal potential games
This section contains a characterization of ordinal potential games. The absence of weak im-
provement cycles was a necessary condition. If (X;) is properly ordered, this is also a sucient
condition.
Theorem 3.1 A strategic game G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni is an ordinal potential game if and
only if the following two conditions are satised:
1. X contains no weak improvement cycles;
2. (X;) is properly ordered.
Proof. ()): Assume P is an ordinal potential for G. X contains no weak improvement cycles
by Lemma 2.1. Dene F : X ! IR by taking for all [x] 2 X : F ([x]) = P (x). To see that
F is well-dened, let y; z 2 [x]. Since y  z there is a non-deteriorating path from y to z and
vice versa. But since the game has no weak improvement cycles, all changes in the payo to the
deviating players along these paths must be zero: P (y) = P (z).
Now take [x]; [y] 2 X with [x]  [y]. Since x < y, there is a non-deteriorating path from x
to y, so P (x)  P (y). Moreover, since x and y are in dierent equivalence classes, some player
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must have gained from deviating along this path: P (x) < P (y). Hence F ([x]) < F ([y]).
((): Assume that the two conditions hold. Since (X;) is properly ordered, there exists a
function F : X ! IR that preserves the order . Dene P : X ! IR by P (x) = F ([x]) for all
x 2 X . Let i 2 N , x i 2 X i, and xi; yi 2 X i.
 If ui(xi; x i)   ui(yi; x i) > 0, then (yi; x i) < (xi; x i), and by the absence of weak
improvement cycles: not (xi; x i)< (yi; x i). Hence [(yi; x i)]  [(xi; x i)], which implies
P (xi; x i)  P (yi; x i) = F ([(xi; x i)])  F ([(yi; x i)]) > 0.
 Assume P (xi; x i)   P (yi; x i) > 0. Then [(xi; x i)] 6= [(yi; x i)], so ui(xi; x i) 6=
ui(yi; x i). If ui(xi; x i) < ui(yi; x i), then (xi; x i) < (yi; x i), and hence [(xi; x i)] 
[(yi; x i)]. But then P (xi; x i)  P (yi; x i) = F ([(xi; x i)])  F ([(yi; x i)]) < 0, a contra-
diction. Hence ui(xi; x i)  ui(yi; x i) > 0.
Conclude that P is an ordinal potential for the game G. 2
The rst condition in Theorem 3.1 involving cycles closely resembles a characterization of exact
potential games in Monderer and Shapley (1996). A strategic game is an exact potential game if
and only if the payo changes to deviating players along a cycle sum to zero. In fact, it suces
to look at cycles involving only four deviations. The next example indicates that the absence of
weak improvement cycles involving four deviations only is not sucient to characterize ordinal
potential games.
Example 3.1 Suppose P is an ordinal potential of the game in Figure 3. Then P has to satisfy:
P (T; L) > P (T;R) = P (M;R) = P (M;M) = P (B;M) = P (B;L) = P (T; L), which is clearly
impossible: this is not an ordinal potential game. It is easy to check, however, that the order
condition is satised and that there are no weak improvement cycles involving exactly four
deviations.
L M R
T 0,1 1,2 0,0
M 1,1 0,0 0,0
B 0,0 0,0 1,1
Figure 3
4 Countable and uncountable games
Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 give sucient conditions for (X;) to be properly ordered. A consequence
of Lemma 2.2 is that a game G with a countable strategy space X is an ordinal potential game
if and only if it contains no weak improvement cycles. The strategy space X is countable if
1. the set N of players is nite and every player i 2 N has a countable set X i of strategies,
or
2. the set N of players is countably innite, only nitely many players have a countably
innite number of strategies, and the other players have nitely many strategies.
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Theorem 4.1 Let G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni be a strategic game. If X is countable, then G is
an ordinal potential game if and only if X contains no weak improvement cycles.
Proof. If X is countable, X is countable. According to Lemma 2.2, (X;) is properly
ordered, so the result now follows from Theorem 3.1. 2
Theorem 4.1 generalizes the analogous result from Voorneveld (1996) for nite games. The
mixed extension of a nite ordinal potential game may not be an ordinal potential game, as
shown in Sela (1992).
A consequence of Lemma 2.3 is that if (X;) contains a countable -order dense sub-
set, then the absence of weak improvement cycles is once again enough to characterize ordinal
potential games.
Theorem 4.2 Let G = hN; (X i)i2N ; (u
i)i2Ni be a strategic game. If (X;) contains a count-
able -order dense subset, then G is an ordinal potential game if and only if X contains no weak
improvement cycles.
Proof. By Lemma 2.3, (X;) is properly ordered. The result follows from Theorem 3.1. 2
This section is concluded with an example of a game with an uncountable strategy space in which
no weak improvement cycles exist, but which is not an ordinal potential game since (X;) is
not properly ordered.
Example 4.1 Consider the two-player game G with X1 = f0; 1g; X2 = IR, and payo functions
dened by u1(x; y) =
(
x if y 2 Q
 x if y 62 Q
and u2(x; y) = y for all (x; y) 2 f0; 1g IR.
This game has no weak improvement cycles, since every weak improvement cycle trivially
has to include deviations by at least two players. But if the second player deviates once and
improves his payo, he has to return to his initial strategy eventually, thereby reducing his
payo.
We show that this game nevertheless is not an ordinal potential game. Suppose, to the
contrary, that P is an ordinal potential for G. We show that this implies the existence of an
injective function f from the uncountable set IR nQ to the countable set Q, a contradiction.
For each y 2 IR n Q, u1(0; y) = 0 >  1 = u1(1; y), so P (0; y) > P (1; y). Fix f(y) 2
[P (1; y); P (0; y)]\ Q. In order to show that f : IR nQ ! Q is injective, let x; z 2 IR nQ; x < z.
Then there exists a number y 2 (x; z)\ Q. However:8><
>:
u2(0; x) < u2(0; y)
u1(0; y) < u1(1; y)




P (0; x) < P (0; y)
< P (1; y)
< P (1; z)
Since f(x) 2 [P (1; x); P (0; x)] and f(z) 2 [P (1; z); P (0; z)], it follows that f(x) < f(z). So f is
injective, a contradiction.
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